The Turkish advance was boldly conceived, and well [illegible]. Although it did not achieve its prime object of raiding [illegible] Egypt and blocking the Canal, it had a great effect. The [illegible] stration of the possibility of bringing so large a force as [illegible] men of all arms across the Sinai Desert so impressed the [illegible] that the next time the canal was threatened nearly 400,000 [illegible] were massed in Egypt. Moreover, the event showed that [illegible] Egypt, and defending the Suez Canal, are not synonymous. [illegible] slipping in the canal is obstructed, unless the canal is [illegible] from further east than its own banks.

The Turkish effort deserves admiration. To bring [illegible] 15,000 men, artillery and pontoon train across 140 miles of [illegible] was creditable; to assault a front defended potentially by [illegible] men, and the heavy metal of ships' armament, was audacious [illegible] to depart again with artillery and baggage intact, and a loss of [illegible] 10 per cent. of infantry was clear gain and left the defenders [illegible] to boast of. The Turks gave out that the attack was merely a reconnaissance raid, the precursor of a real descent in force. A German account published later declared that the Suez Canal was bridged, five battalions got across, and, but for the bulk of the attackers missing their way in a sand storm which enabled a cruiser to come up and sink the bridge, the invasion of Egypt would have been accomplished!

Among the features of these first four months of war in Egypt and Sinai, the most prominent were:—

(*a*) The general unpreparedness for war;

(*b*) Scanty knowledge of the water resources and routes of the Northern and Sinai Deserts;

(*c*) Lack of appreciation of the extent to which a descent on Egypt from east or west was practicable.

The attack on the Suez Canal was met by purely passive defence. There was no intention of or preparation for either counter-attack or pursuit. Although the Imperial Cavalry Brigade crossed the Suez Canal after the Turkish attack had failed, it merely watched the retreating enemy and returned to its camps. The moral effect of this inaction was that the Turk, although he failed, felt unbeaten and he returned to attack again with greater forces 18 months later. Lack of transport has been urged in excuse for this. But Egypt and the Sudan employed normally—and ultimately furnished the army with—thousands of camels and donkeys. And the Yeomanry and the Overseas troops in Cairo were admirable material at hand for extemporizing Camelry.

(*To be continued.*)

PLATE 3.

TURKISH ATTACK
— ON THE —
SUEZ CANAL
4th Febry. 1915.
Troops IN DEVERSOIR-TUSSUM AREA
19th Lancs. R.F.A. 4 guns
5th E.A. Batty 4 guns
2 maxims
1st Fd Co. R.E. (E. Lancs.)
N.Z. Infy. Canterbury Bn. 2 platoons
2nd Q.V.O. Rajputs
62nd Punjabis
92nd "
2/10 Gurkha Rifles
128th Pioneers
137th Fd Amb.
Lines of Turkish Night Attack
Turkish attack on SERAPEUM 0930
To Wadi Mukheib 23 Miles
Low Sand Hills
Fresh Water Canal
7 Miles
K 120
Ain Gasein Station
E.A.M. Batty 2 Plns. 128 Pion. Escort
1 Co. 128 Pion
2 Plat. Canterbury Bn. N.Z.I.
19th E. Lancs. Regt.
27th Punj
Local Reserve
SERAPEUM Mity Post
2 Cos. 92 Punj
1 Co. 27 Punj
Posts A B C D 2 Plat. each 2nd Rajputs
High bank
K 120
Draw Bridge
1½ Cos. 128 Pion.
Good landing under cover
O.P.
DEVERSOIR Mity Post
2 Cos. 2/10th Gurkha Rifles
2 m.g.
1 Co. 128 Pion
2 Platoons 6 P
DEVERSOIR CAPE
K 130
From Suez
GREAT BITTER LAKE
Scale 1 inch to 1 Mile
0
1
2
3 Miles
Mile

1st BATTLE OF GAZA
26th/27th March, 1917.
Plate V.
Patrols to Deir Sneid and Huj
To Deir Sneid 9 miles
2nd L.H. Bde.
Jebalieh
A & N.Z. Mtd Div.
Sheikh el Redwan
Sand Hills
Groves
Sh. Hasan
Wadi Hanafi
Fryers Hill
GAZA
Ali el Muntar
Yeomanry Mtd Div.
Open undulating Country
To BEERSHEBA
Approx line of 53rd Div. at 1800
Outpost Hill
Ridge
Umbrella Hill
Samson Ridge
Sand Dunes
Blazed Hill
Kurd Hill
Mansura Ridge
54th Division
Sheikh Abbas Ridge
Col. Money's Detachment
Money Hill
Limit of sand hills
Open ground
Tel el Ahmar
Broken Ground Waterworn
El Burjaliye
Well
Red Ho.
Dry Wadi
El Sire
Ghuzzee
Open Grass Land
Sheikh Shabasi
El Breij
H.Q. Eastern Force
Wadi Sheria
Dry
Wadi Sheria
Sharta
Mandur
Imp. Camel Bde.
Route of Mounted Troops
Wadi Singer
53rd Div. at 0200 26th March
155 Bde of 52 Div (in Reserve)
Lake (Fresh water)
INSEIRAT HILLS
Tel el Jemmi
To Shellal 7 miles
DEIR EL BELAH
Beach for Supplies
52nd moved to INSEIRAT night 26-27th
From Khan Yunus 9 miles
at Khan Yunus 26. 3. 17.
52nd Div.
Positions night 24/25 March
A & N.Z. Mtd Div. } Outposts on Wadi Ghuzzee
Yeo'ry Mtd Div. } Remainder Deir el Belah
53rd Div. ..... Inseirat
54th Div. ..... Khan Yunus
52nd Div. .....
Scale 1/40,000
1000 500 0 1000 2000 3000 yds.
Ordnance Survey, January 1921.

MAP No 5330

PALESTINE. THE SECOND OFFENSIVE.
CAPTURE OF BEERSHEBA.
SITUATION AT 1800 on 29TH OCTOBER 1917.

PLATE No VI.



Ordnance Survey, January 1921.

JERUSALEM OPERATIONS

Plate No VIII

BATTLE OF NEBI SAMWIL.

SITUATION AT 1800 ON 21ST NOVR 1917.



Scale – 1/500.000

Miles 10 5 0 10 20 Miles

Ordnance Survey, January 1921.

MAP No 329.

CAPTURE OF JERUSALEM.

ACTIONS OF 7-9TH DECEMBER 1917.

PLATE No IX



Ordnance Survey January 1931

CENTRAL PALESTINE

OPERATIONS IN & BEYOND THE JORDAN VALLEY.

MAP No 331

PLATE No XI.



AN OUTLINE OF THE EGYPTIAN AND PALESTINE CAMPAIGNS 1914–1918.

By MAJOR-GENERAL SIR M. G. E. BOWMAN-MANIFOLD, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., p.s.c.

(Continued).

CHAPTER X.

THE ARAB ARMY.—The Desert Arab temperamentally unfitted for normal warfare—Creation of a regular army for the Hedjaz—Feisal's move to Wejh—Captain T. E. Lawrence's theory of a warfare suited to the Arab—Feisal's move to Wejh—Captain T. E. Lawrence's theory of a warfare suited to the Arab—Capture of Akaba from inland—Investment of Maan—Tasks of the Arab Army during the Beersheba–Jerusalem operations—Growth of the Arab Army: Feisal's flying column.

THE ARAB ARMY.

AFTER the Sherif of Mecca's revolt in June, 1916, the Turks sent reinforcements by rail to Medina, and seriously intended to crush the Arabs, and retake Mecca.

Although the desert Arabs of the Hedjaz were fired with enthusiasm for the cause of freedom, and wished to win it for their country, and their less fortunate kin, they were temperamentally unfitted to oppose trained troops in normal warfare. They were volatile, and handicapped by tribal traditions and jealousies. They came and went as they pleased, and generally would not serve outside their tribal area. Their blood feuds complicated their concentrations and actions.

When the Turks easily brushed aside the tribesmen, posted on apparently impregnable positions, it was urged that a more stable and highly-trained and organized force was necessary to resist them, and the idea of creating a Hedjaz regular army arose. The nucleus for such a force existed in the peasants from villages near Medina, who had been driven out by the Turks, and from others near Mecca. At the same time Captain T. E. Lawrence, who was then with Sherif Feisal, saw that the Hedjaz would best be defended, not directly—by blocking the Mecca road—but by getting on the flank and nerves of the Turks. He prevailed upon Feisal to adopt this strategy and, with the assistance of the Royal Navy, to convey his men along the coast to Wejh, about 250 miles north of where he then was. The Arabs entered Wejh on 22nd January, 1917, and found themselves 150 miles behind Medina. (*Plate* I.)

Immediately the Turks became alarmed. In a short time 11,000 men were put to garrison posts along that line, and all danger to Mecca ceased.